INTERVENTIONS Inpatient laboratory test groups were randomly assigned to display Medicare allowable fees (30 in intervention) or not (30 in control) in the electronic health record.
I t is estimated that nearly 30% of laboratory testing in the United States may be wasteful. 1 Unnecessary blood draws can cause patient discomfort 2, 3 and harm from hospitalacquired anemia. 4 It may also be associated with increased rates of false-positive results leading to increased costs and potential adverse outcomes from unwarranted interventions. 5 With the rising adoption of the electronic health record (EHR), 6 many health systems are considering increasing price transparency at the time of order entry to influence clinician ordering behavior. 7 While the evidence on these types of approaches is growing, the findings have been inconsistent, and most studies were not randomized clinical trials. 8, 9 Two recent studies 10, 11 tested price transparency for laboratory ordering and found only modest reductions in order rates. However, both interventions were only 6 months in duration, and neither analysis was risk-adjusted for patient comorbidities. Another 2 recent studies 12, 13 tested price transparency for imaging and procedures and both found no significant effect.
To advance existing evidence and to address limitations of prior studies, we conducted a randomized clinical trial at 3 hospitals to evaluate the effect of displaying Medicare allowable fees for inpatient laboratory tests on clinician ordering behavior. We compared changes over a 1-year preintervention period and a 1-year intervention period, adjusting for time trends and patient demographics, insurance, disposition, and comorbidity severity.
Methods

Study Design
The PRICE (Pragmatic Randomized Introduction of Cost data through the Electronic health record) trial was conducted at 3 hospitals at the University of Pennsylvania Health System and compared changes in clinician ordering of inpatient laboratory tests with and without displaying Medicare allowable fees. Changes in outcomes were evaluated 1 year before and 1 year during the intervention, which began on April 8, 2015 . The study protocol is available online in Supplement 1 and was approved by the University of Pennsylvania institutional review board. Neither clinicians nor patients were compensated for their participation.
Study Setting and Population
All 3 sites (Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, Penn Presbyterian Medical Center, and Pennsylvania Hospital) are adult hospitals located in Philadelphia and share the same EHR, Sunrise Clinical Manager (Allscripts Corp). Clinicians who could place orders in the EHR included faculty physicians, residents and fellows, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. The sample comprised patients admitted and discharged in either the preintervention (April 8, 2014 , to April 7, 2015) or the intervention (April 8, 2015 , to April 7, 2016) periods. Patients with an admission in 1 period and a discharge either in the next period or after the study completed were excluded.
Randomization and Interventions
We randomly assigned 60 groups of inpatient laboratory tests to either display fees (in 2015 US dollars) in the EHR (intervention) or not (control). Randomization was performed at the test level because the EHR system did not allow for randomization at the level of the clinician or site. The randomization protocol was adapted from prior studies 11, 12 and conducted as follows. First, a list of higher volume and more expensive tests was compiled using November 2014 data from the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. The list comprised 75 inpatient laboratory tests: 30 classified as higher volume, 30 classified as more expensive (based on 2014 charge data), and 15 that were in both categories. Second, we grouped tests that could be ordered individually and as a panel, as well as tests with similar alternatives. By grouping tests in this manner, we avoided scenarios in which clinicians would have increased price transparency for only part of a group of similar options. Specifically, we grouped (1) complete blood cell count with and without a differential; (2) varying sizes of basic metabolic panels as well as the individual tests they comprised (sodium, potassium, chloride, bicarbonate, urea nitrogen, creatinine, glucose, and calcium levels); and (3) liver function panel, total bilirubin, direct bilirubin, alkaline phosphate, alanine aminotransferase, and aspartate aminotransferase levels. Third, stratified randomization was conducted using a computerized random number generator as follows: first, the top quartile of higher volume tests were randomized, then among remaining tests the top quartile of more expensive tests were randomized, and finally the remaining tests were randomized. For the laboratory test groups randomized to the intervention arm, fees were displayed in the EHR at the time of order search results and entry along with the following text at the time of entry: "The dollar amount represents Medicare reimbursement for the test. Actual costs to the consumer may vary by patient insurance status." On implementation, clinicians were informed by email and at in-person meetings that this was part of a health system-wide initiative to improve high value care and they were required to acknowledge a 1-time message within the EHR.
that the intervention group would have a significant reduction in the number of tests ordered per patient-day and associated fees relative to the control group over time. Owing to the nature of the intervention, clinicians could not be blinded to group assignment. All investigators, statisticians, and data analysts were blinded to the results until the study was completed.
Data and Statistical Analysis
Patient information, including admissions, discharges, demographics, comorbidities, length of stay, hospital location, and the number of tests ordered and performed, was obtained from Penn Data Store, the health system's clinical data warehouse. 14 Multivariate linear regression models were fitted for the continuous outcomes variables of tests ordered and performed per patient-day, and associated fees for tests ordered and performed per patient-day using the patient admission as the unit of analysis. For each patient admission, an observation was generated to represent the number of intervention group tests ordered per inpatient-day, and another observation was generated to represent the number of control group tests ordered per day. Binary variables were used to indicate group (intervention or control) and time period (preintervention or intervention). Models were adjusted for calendar month and hospital site fixed effects, as well as patient characteristics including age, sex, race/ethnicity, insurance status, and discharge disposition. Models were risk-adjusted for patient comorbidity severity using the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), which predicts 10-year mortality, 15 and standard errors were adjusted to account for clustering by patient. 16, 17 The effect of the intervention for each calendar month in the intervention period was evaluated using an interaction term between time period (preintervention or intervention) and group (intervention or control) for the calendar month. To assess the mean effect during the entire intervention period, the LSMEANS command in SAS statistical software (SAS Institute Inc) was used to conduct a linear combination of the interaction terms.
18,19
To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we estimated the model using patient length of stay as a covariate to adjust for differences that may have occurred in the frequency of ordering among patient admissions of different durations. We also conducted a series of exploratory subgroup analyses. First, to evaluate differences in ordering behavior among patients with higher and lower comorbidity risk scores, we estimated a model using only patients in the top quartile (CCI ≥3) and another model using only patients in the bottom quartile (CCI = 0). Second, because clinicians in the intensive care unit (ICU) may make more frequent decisions and therefore may be more exposed to the price transparency intervention, we estimated the main model separately for patients who had an ICU stay and those who did not. Third, because different magnitudes of fee values exposed through price transparency may influences its effect, we estimated the main model for all patients but separately for tests with the top and bottom quartiles of Medicare allowable fee value.
To test if trends between the 2 study arms were similar during the preintervention period, a test of controls was conducted for tests ordered per patient-day and associated fees by comparing the second half of the preintervention period with the first half of the preintervention period.
All hypothesis tests were 2-sided and used a significance level of P < .05. All statistical analyses were conducted using SAS software, version 9.4.
Results
The sample included 142 921 hospital admissions representing patients who were 51.9% white (74 165), 38.9% black (55 526), and 56.9% female (81 291) with a mean (SD) age of 54.7 (19.0) years. Laboratory test group strata are presented in Figure 1 (test allocation information is available in eTable 1 in Supplement 2)( Table 1) .
During the preintervention period, the mean number of tests ordered per patient-day was 2.31 in the control group and 3.93 in the intervention group ( Figure 2) . A test of controls during the preintervention period found no significant difference in trend when comparing the intervention group with the control group (0.03 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, −0.04-0.10; P = .35). In the intervention period, the mean number of tests ordered per patient-day was 2.34 in the control group and 4.01 in the intervention group (Figure 2) . The number of tests ordered varied by hospital sites, but trends were similar between the intervention and control groups (eTable 2 and eFigures 1-3 in Supplement 2). Unadjusted changes for each laboratory test are available (eTables 3 and 4 in Supplement 2)
During the preintervention period, the mean associated fees per patient-day was $27.77 in the control group and $37.84 in the intervention group. A test of controls during the preintervention period found a small but significant diverging trend when comparing the intervention group with the control group ($1.85; 95% CI, $0.92-$2.78; P < .001). During the intervention period, the mean associated fee per patient-day was $27.59 in the control group and $38.85 in the intervention group. Charlson comorbidity index, median (IQR)
In the main adjusted analyses of test ordering behavior for the intervention group compared with the control group over time, there was no significant overall change (0.05 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, −0.002 to 0.09; P = .06). This finding was supported by sensitivity analyses adjusting for patient length of stay ( Table 2) . In subset analyses, several changes of smaller magnitude were found to be significant. There was a significant relative decrease in test ordering for patients with an ICU stay (−0.16 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, −0.31 to −0.01; P = .04) and a significant relative increase in test ordering for patients without an ICU stay (0.13 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, 0.08-0.17; P < .001). There was a significant relative decrease in test ordering among tests in the top quartile of fees (−0.01 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, −0.02 to −0.01; P < .001) and a significant relative increase in test ordering among tests in the bottom quartile of fees (0.03 tests ordered per patient-day; 95% CI, 0.002-0.06; P = .04). For the secondary outcome of tests performed per patientday, estimates were mostly significant, but of small magnitude and in a similar direction as the estimates for the primary outcome of tests ordered per patient-day (Table 2 ).
In adjusted analyses of associated fees per patient-day, results were similar for tests ordered and performed (Table 3) . Overall, there was no significant change. In subset analyses, there was a small but significant increase among patients with an ICU stay ($1.69; 95% CI, $1.06-$2.33; P < .001) and for tests in the bottom quartile of fees ($0.19; 95% CI, $0.05-$0.34; P = .01). There was a small but significant decrease for tests in the top quartile of fees (−$0.34; 95% CI, −$0.62 to −$0.06; P = .02).
Discussion
There is growing interest in using price transparency to influence medical decision-making toward higher value care, [20] [21] [22] but prior evidence on its effectiveness has been inconsistent. 8, 9 In this year-long randomized clinical trial conducted at 3 hospitals, displaying Medicare allowable fees in the EHR for inpatient laboratory tests at the time of order entry did not lead to any meaningful or consistent changes in overall clinician ordering behavior or associated fees. Our study incorporated sev- eral important design elements that differ from the existing literature on the effects of price transparency, including a longer duration, multiple hospital sites, grouping of similar test options, and adjustment for patient demographics, insurance, disposition, and comorbidity severity.
8-12
The absence of an overall effect on test ordering behavior from the intervention in this study may be due to several factors, and these may have important implications for hospitals considering using price transparency to change clinician behavior. First, the price transparency intervention in this study was always displayed regardless of the clinical scenario. The presence of this information for appropriate tests may have diminished its impact when tests were inappropriate. Future efforts may consider more selective targeting of price transparency.
Second, the salience of the intervention might have been further reduced owing to clinician practice habit. In a qualitative analysis 23 at one of the hospital sites, 91% of resident physicians reported that unnecessary laboratory testing was due to the practice habit of entering repeating daily laboratory test orders on the patient's first day of admission. The test may become more unnecessary later into the hospitalization, but if repeating orders were entered at the time of hospital admission, the clinician would not need to place another order for them and thus would not be presented with price transparency information when it would be most salient. One indication of this may have been demonstrated when comparing changes for patients with and without an ICU stay. Because health care decisions are changing more rapidly in this setting, clinicians may be less likely to rely on repeating orders and therefore may have been exposed to the intervention more often. Future efforts might also consider pairing price transparency information with changing the default setting in the EHR so clinicians cannot order repeating laboratory testing for an extended duration.
24
Third, the framing of information in price transparency interventions may have an important influence on its effectiveness owing to anchoring bias. 22, 25 Clinicians may have previously believed that the cost of some tests was higher than the price that was displayed. One indication of this was that we found a small but significant decrease in test ordering for the top quartile of fees (most expensive) and a small but significant increase in test ordering for the bottom quartile of Medicare fees (least expensive). Future efforts may consider other ways to frame price transparency, such as comparisons of differences in price between options, using other forms of price, such as charges, or targeting only more expensive tests.
It is important to note that there were small but significant overall changes in tests performed but not in tests ordered. It is unclear how much of the difference in findings between these 2 outcomes is due to the price transparency intervention or other factors that occur after the clinician has placed an order for a test. However, the small magnitude of the estimates contributes to the central finding that the intervention was not associated with any meaningful or consistent effects.
Limitations
This study is subject to several limitations. First, our findings are from patients at 3 hospital sites. While the patient populations varied among hospitals, all are located in Philadelphia, and this may limit generalizability to other settings. Second, owing to limitations of the EHR, randomization was performed at the level of the test and decisions on orders for tests in the control group may have been susceptible to spillover effects from the intervention group. However, we did not observe a significant decline in ordering within either group in isolation, indicating that our findings are more likely due to ineffectiveness than spillover effects. Third, tests in the intervention group had a higher baseline order rate than those of the control group. While randomization was stratified, this was largely driven by the intervention group including basic metabolic panel. However, a test of controls could not reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends between study groups for ordering behavior during the preintervention period. Fourth, information on clinicians was not available for comparison and model adjustment. Finally, our study evaluated price transparency using Medicare allowable fees, and further study is necessary to evaluate the impact of other forms of price transparency. 
Abstract
Excessive use of laboratory tests contributes to significant costs in the US healthcare system, and these high costs do not translate to consistent improvement in quality of care and outcomes. One reason for excessive laboratory testing is that most physicians do not know how much tests cost. Inpatient care providers frequently order laboratory tests without any appreciation for the costs of these tests. Computerized order entry systems offer the opportunity to engage providers in cost-control efforts and influence their ordering behavior. This study is a controlled clinical trial to determine whether we could decrease the volume of inpatient laboratory tests ordered by presenting providers with the Medicare allowable fees for lab tests (i.e. the maximum dollar amount that Medicare will reimburse the hospital for a test) at the time of order entry. We will randomly assign about 60 laboratory tests to an active arm (fee displayed) or to a control arm (fee not displayed). The primary outcome will be the change in the number of tests ordered per patient day over time (24 months duration, 12 months pre-and post-intervention) and by study group (active test vs. control). This work will further our understanding of how displaying prices, such as Medicare reimbursement fees, in the electronic health record impacts physician ordering. A reduction in unnecessary tests could result in less blood draws on patients, decreased utilization of resources by phlebotomy and in the laboratory, and cost savings to the health system.
Overall objectives
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of presenting Medicare allowable fees for inpatient laboratory tests in the electronic health record on provider ordering behavior.
Aims
Primary outcome
The primary outcome is the number of tests ordered per patient-day.
Secondary outcome
The secondary outcome is the total associated Medicare allowable fees of tests ordered per patient-day.
Background
Healthcare in the United States is increasingly expensive, and these high costs do not translate to consistent improvement in quality of care and outcomes [1, 2] . In 2011, over-treatment and excessive use of diagnostic tests contributed upwards of $226 billion in waste to the US healthcare system [3] . Laboratory testing is widely recognized as a key form of potential waste, with the literature estimating that as much as 25% of diagnostic testing is either redundant or of limited clinical value [4] . One study found that 67.9% (2.01 tests per patient-day) of inpatient laboratory tests ordered during a 6-month period did not contribute to patient care [5] . Empirical evidence supports the idea that not all tests ordered are needed to provide high quality care and that new payment models are increasingly focused on reducing healthcare utilization and costs as integral to improving health care quality [6, 7] .
One reason for excessive testing is that most physicians do not know how much tests cost.
Studies have demonstrated that physicians have a poor understanding of the costs of care and feel uncomfortable initiating discussions about costs with their patients [8, 9] . However, recent data suggests that physicians are willing to participate in efforts to control the rising health care costs [10] .
Electronic health records offer the opportunity to engage providers in cost-control efforts and influence their ordering behavior. There has been an array of studies of technology-based interventions to promote cost transparency and improve the use of laboratory testing. In a 1990 study, Tierney et al displayed charges at the time of test ordering in an outpatient academic clinic and found that the number of laboratories and cost decreased but the difference did not persist after the intervention ended [11] . Bates et al in 1997 displayed the hospital charges in an inpatient academic hospital at the time of order entry, using a computer-based system, but found no changes in testing volume [12] . However, a key limitation of this study was contamination between the two randomized groups, which occurred at the patient level. A provider who saw the fee of a complete blood cell count presented for a given patient was likely to remember that information when ordering the same test on a different patient and might have communicated this information to a colleague. Physicians could have learned about charges for tests for patients in the intervention group and applied this information to the control patients. Recently, Feldman et al. demonstrated that providing clinicians with the Medicare allowable price fees of diagnostic laboratory tests at the time of order entry resulted in a modest decrease in test ordering and lower costs [13] . Here the investigators took 61 lab tests, some of which were the most frequently ordered and others were most expensive, and randomized at the test level with 30 tests in an active arm (fee displayed) and 31 tests in a control arm (fee not displayed). They did not, however, assure equal stratification of most ordered and most expensive tests in each arm. Consequently, one key study limitation was asymmetric randomization of tests with more than 3 times more frequently ordered tests in the active arm than in the control arm. This asymmetry may have affected the study's estimate of net changes in charges from baseline to the intervention period.
The purpose of our investigation is to replicate Feldman et al.'s study with an important modification. We will systematically perform symmetric randomization of tests by ensuring equal number of most frequently ordered and most expensive tests are in each arm. We hypothesize that we could influence inpatient providers ordering behavior by displaying prices of laboratory tests in the computerized provider order entry system. This is a controlled clinical trial that will be conducted at the University of Pennsylvania Health System. We have adapted our study design from Feldman et al.'s prior work in the literature in which inpatient providers were presented with the Medicare allowable price fees of diagnostic laboratory tests at the time of order entry and test ordering volume was measured and analyzed. Using data from fiscal year 2014, we will compile a list of about 60 diagnostic laboratory tests, 30 that are the most frequently ordered and 30 that are most expensive. For all selected tests, we will define the display cost as the 2015 Medicare allowable fee, which is the maximum price Medicare will reimburse the hospital for the test. This information will be provided to us from the leadership of the health systems' Division of Laboratory Medicine. Randomization will be performed at the test level. Specifically, the 60-selected diagnostic laboratory tests will randomly be assigned with about 30 to an active arm (fee displayed) and 30 to a control arm (fee not displayed). Our test intervention will be to display Medicare allowable fees for the active tests arm using the computerized order entry system, Sunrise Clinical Manager (Allscript Corp). Our primary outcome is the number of tests ordered per patient-day. Our secondary outcome is the total associated Medicare allowable fees of tests ordered per patient-day. We will analyze change in these outcomes by test arm (active vs. control) and over time (baseline vs. post intervention period).
Of note, the list of 60 diagnostic laboratory tests, 30 that are the most frequently ordered and 30 that are most expensive, include HIV antibody blood test. As a result, we will need to identify the number of tests ordered and performed during the duration of this study. In regards to HIV antibody test information, we would like to clarify that (1) we are not requesting the results of these tests (e.g., positive or negative), but are only interested in the number of tests ordered and performed; (2) this information is necessary to the proposed study objectives. In this study we are testing change in physician ordering (the number of tests per patient-day) before and after the intervention (presenting test Medicare fee data in the electronic health record). The primary outcome is the change in the number of tests ordered per patient-day over time. HIV antibody tests is one of the tests we identified in our intervention arm (fee displayed), and therefore it is necessary to obtain the number of tests ordered and ordered pre-and post-intervention to meet the study objective.
Study duration
The duration of this study is 6 months. We will define the "baseline period" as the 3 months prior to the intervention. We will define the "intervention period" as the 3 months after. The intervention, itself, will be displaying hospital charges of randomly selected tests in what we will call our "active tests" arm.
Target population
The target population in the study are all providers, both physician and non-physicians, who order inpatient laboratory tests at our tertiary care academic center.
Accrual
Not applicable
Key inclusion criteria
Not applicable
Key exclusion criteria
None
Subject recruitment
No active recruitment
Subject compensation
None
Study procedures
Consent
We are requesting a waiver of consent. This study could not be practicably carried out without the waiver of consent. It is not practical to consent every single ordering provider at UPHS. Nor do we wish to do so, if it was. We believe that a wavier of consent is necessary in order to avoid a confounding factor in ordering behavior by notifying subjects of this research and therefore impacting our study design. We simply wish to assess how seeing charge prices will impact physician behavior.
Procedures
Analysis plan
We will use t-tests or Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (F-tests or Kruskal-Wallis test) for continuous variables and Pearson chi square tests or Fishers exact tests for categorical variables. In our primary analyses we will use direct comparisons of outcomes by arm and over time. All hypothesis tests will be 2-sided. We will use STATA and/or SAS to analyze the data.
Investigators
Mitesh 
Human research protection
Data confidentiality
Paper-based records will be kept in a secure location and only be accessible to personnel involved in the study. Computer-based files will only be made available to personnel involved in the study through the use of access privileges and passwords. Wherever feasible, identifiers will be removed from study-related information. Precautions are in place to ensure the data are secure by using passwords and encryption, because the research involves web-based surveys.
Subject confidentiality
We are requesting to obtain Data that will include MRN and DOB identifiers from PDS. After obtaining the data, each patient will be assigned a unique, numeric identifier that will be used on all collected study information and the MRN information will be deleted. The source document in which the unique identifier is associated with personal information will be stored in a password protected computer file to which only study primary investigators have access. Threats to confidentiality will be minimized by careful data collection and the private and secure webbased platform. At the conclusion of the study, all identifying information will be destroyed and all data will be archived in a password-protected folder. All other study investigators or statistician will be limited to access only de-identified data. All of these personnel will have completed research and confidentiality (CITI) training. All data for this project will be stored on the secure firewalled servers of the University of Pennsylvania, in data files that will be protected by multiple password layers. These data servers are maintained in a guarded facility behind several locked doors, with very limited physical access rights. They are also cyber-protected by extensive firewalls and multiple layers of communication encryption. Electronic access rights are carefully controlled by UPenn system managers. We will use highly secure methods of data encryption for all transactions using a level of security comparable to what is used in commercial financial transactions. We believe this multi-layer system of data security, identical to the system protecting the University of Pennsylvania Health Systems medical records, greatly minimizes the risk of loss of privacy.
Subject privacy
Not applicable.
Data disclosure
Data safety and monitoring
The principal investigator and co-investigator will work with the patient safety office to monitor any provider or patient safety reports and monitor for any adverse effects. They will also be responsible to ensure that all electronic data will be stored on the University of Pennsylvania approved computers and limited to the members of the research team.
Risk/benefit
Potential study risks
The main risk of this intervention is that displaying Medicare allowable fees directly results in not ordering a test that is needed for a patient resulting in harm. Several prior studies have been conducted at similar institutions, and this has not been associated with patient harm. Bates et al in 1997 displayed the charges in an inpatient academic hospital at the time of order entry, using a computer-based system, and more recently, Feldman et al. in 2013 performed a similar studies using Medicare allowable price fees of diagnostic laboratory tests presented to ordering provider at the time of order entry. Neither of these controlled clinical trials reported any patient harm. We will work with the patient safety office to monitor any provider or patient safety reports and monitor for any adverse effects. We are also deliberately choosing routine lab orders (e.g. complete blood cell count, basic metabolic panel) that are not often associated with adverse effects, and if later they are determined to be needed, they can be ordered STAT, and results may be obtained within one hour. The other risk of this study is loss of data. We have described the measures taken to protect the data including security measures and training of research staff. There are no other direct risks to patients in the sample.
Potential study benefits
This study could result in improving the understanding of how displaying costs in the electronic health record impacts physician ordering. A reduction in unnecessary tests could result in less blood draws on patients, decreased utilization of resources by phlebotomy and the laboratory, and cost savings to the health system.
Risk/benefit assessment
The potential for significant direct benefits from reductions in unnecessary lab ordering and insights that can inform other electronic health record interventions outweigh the risks of not ordering a test when needed. Specifically, because these tend to be routine, not emergent tests, and if they are later deemed necessary, they can be ordered and completed within one hour.
Summary of Changes to the Protocol
The original protocol listed the pre-intervention period as 3 months and post-intervention period as 3 months. However, after obtaining approval from the health system to study the longer-term impact, the protocol was modified to compare a 12-month pre-intervention period with a 12-month post-intervention period. No other changes were made to the protocol.
Final Study Protocol
The 
Abstract
Overall objectives
Aims
Primary outcome
Secondary outcome
Background
One reason for excessive testing is that most physicians do not know how much tests cost. Studies have demonstrated that physicians have a poor understanding of the costs of care and feel uncomfortable initiating discussions about costs with their patients [8, 9] . However, recent data suggests that physicians are willing to participate in efforts to control the rising health care costs [10] .
Study duration
The duration of this study is 24 months. We will define the "baseline period" as the 12 months prior to the intervention. We will define the "intervention period" as the 12 months after. The intervention, itself, will be displaying Medicare allowable fees of randomly selected tests in what we will call our "active tests" arm.
Target population
Not applicable
Key inclusion criteria
Key exclusion criteria
None
Subject recruitment
Subject compensation
None
Study procedures
Consent
Procedures
Analysis plan
Investigators
Human research protection
Data confidentiality
Subject confidentiality
Data disclosure
Data safety and monitoring
Risk/benefit
Potential study risks
Potential study benefits
Risk/benefit assessment
Original Statistical Analysis Plan
The primary outcome is the number of tests ordered per patient-day. The secondary outcome is the total associated Medicare allowable fees of tests ordered per patient-day.
Changes to Statistical Analysis Plan
None
Final Statistical Analysis Plan
Same as original statistical analysis plan 
